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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that although moral intuitions are insufficient for making judg-
ments on new technological innovations, they maintain great utility for informing
responsible innovation. To do this, this paper employs the Value Sensitive Design
(VSD) methodology as an illustrative example of how stakeholder values can be
better distilled to inform responsible innovation. Further, it is argued that moral
intuitions are necessary for determining stakeholder values required for the design
of responsible technologies. This argument is supported by the claim that the moral
intuitions of stakeholders allow designers to conceptualize stakeholder values and in-
corporate them into the early phases of design. It is concluded that design-for-values
(DFV) frameworks like the VSD methodology can remain potent if developers adopt
heuristic tools to diminish the influence of cognitive biases thus strengthening the
reliability of moral intuitions.
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction
It has long been a contention in the sociology of science that technological artifacts
are embedded with values, whether those values are explicitly designed into them or
not (Magnani, 2013; Pinch & Bijker, 1987; van Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2014; Winner,
2003). As such, technological artifacts become the subject of ethical discourses as the
values that are embedded become of political and social import. The issues associ-
ated with the values in design of technologies becomes exacerbated when we consider
the transformative nature of emerging technologies (King, Whitaker, & Jones, 2011;
Lucivero, Swierstra, & Boenink, 2011; Roache, 2008; Timmermans, Zhao, & van den
Hoven, 2011). This paper shows how many of the design judgments made regarding
emerging technologies are the result not of ethical deliberation but instead of moral
intuition. This moral intuition is shown to be insufficient to responsibly inform research
and innovation.
Since the 1970’s, the study of moral psychology has illuminated not only the ways
in which individuals think about and use their faculty of moral intuitions but also the
extent to which those intuitions map onto the real world usage of technology. Addition-
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ally, empirical work in psychology has shown that a number of cognitive biases may
in fact influence individuals’ reasoning processes (e.g., Caviola, Mannino, Savulescu,
& Faulmuller, 2014; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This influence and the resultant
biased reasoning in moral intuition is particularly evident when the subject of intu-
ition is unique, convoluted or laden with ideology, such as technological innovations
are (Caviola et al., 2014; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic,
2013).
It is the purpose of this paper to outline how technological innovations reveal the
limits of moral intuitions in such a way as to make them apparently insufficient in
informing responsible innovation (RI). In response to such impetus, I argue that it
is only via the inclusion of moral values that RI, viz. value integration at the early
design phases, is possible. To this end, I draw upon the Value Sensitive Design (VSD)
approach amongst the existent design-for-values approaches (DFV), to illustrate this
thesis. VSD is chosen in particular amongst other design methodologies such as par-
ticipatory design, universal design and inclusive design particularly because it both
mandates that designers account for the explicit values of stakeholders as well as how
those values map onto the existent ethical literature. Thus, showing how this philo-
sophically informed framework may be contested has foundational implications for all
DFV approaches which hinge on the incorporation of stakeholder values in technolog-
ical design. Given that the proposed VSD approach requires designers to investigate
the needs and values of stakeholders, the moral intuition of those stakeholders becomes
of particular importance. Hence, given arguments against the favourability of moral
intuitions towards novel technologies, this paper concludes by claiming that the DFV
frameworks can, in fact, remain successful methodologies if designers approach their
investigations with a toolkit of simple heuristics that can reduce the influence of bias
on moral intuition.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to: 1) evaluate the merits of a
DFV approach from the perspective of moral, psychological theory, and 2) restructure
such an approach in such a way as to make it more adaptable to empirical evidence
stemming from moral psychology. Prior literature on VSD has focused on methodol-
ogy (Cummings, 2006; Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2002; Friedman, Kahn Jr., Borning, &
Huldtgren, 2013; Van den Hoven, Lokhorst, & Van de Poel, 2012; van den Hoven &
Weckert, 2008), applications to current technological innovations (Aad Correlje´, Eefje
Cuppen, Marloes Dignum, 2015; Briggs & Thomas, 2015; van den Hoven, 2007) as
well as to novel technologies (Dechesne, Warnier, & van den Hoven, 2013; Friedman,
1997; Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2000; Timmermans et al., 2011; van den Hoven, 2014;
van Wynsberghe, 2013; Van Wynsberghe, 2016). Although these studies provide useful
information, they do not take into account the reliability of all of the constituent parts
of the VSD approach, in this case, the importance of moral intuition in conceptual
investigations. This paper’s application of moral intuition and cognitive biases towards
converging technologies and VSD is comparatively unique. It is the intent of this pa-
per to help spur continued discussions on some of the most pertinent ethical issues
regarding the design of emerging and converging technologies.
To successfully tackle these arguments, this article is organized into the following
sections: the first section will give a more in-depth account of 1) how moral intuitions
are commonly understood in ethics and moral psychology, 2) the strength of moral in-
tuitions when applied to novel technologies, in particular, nano-bio-info-cogno (NBIC)
technologies. The second section will lay out the methodological framework of the VSD
approach so that the reader can better understand the position that values, and con-
sequentially, moral intuitions have in the theory. The third section will draw upon the
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conclusions of the first section to argue that the VSD approach needs to adopt heuris-
tic tools to strengthen its conceptual investigations in determining stakeholder values.
The final section of this paper sketches the broader theoretical implications that these
conclusions induce as well as potential fruitful research streams.
2. Moral intuitiveness and cognitive biases
The application of moral concepts such as deontology (i.e. duty ethics), utility ethics
(e.g. utilitarianism, consequentialism) or virtue ethics definitely have positions in con-
versations about the way that we should act as it concerns emerging technologies.
However, this paper’s primary focus concerns the application and utility of moral in-
tuitions, fraught as they are. In order to do this, I devote the rest of this section to
discussing current conceptions of moral intuitiveness as well as some of the barriers
that moral judgments inevitably encounter.
Although the early history of moral psychology was primarily dominated by ra-
tionalist theories of morality, recent decades have seen a shift, given new empirical
findings and advances in psychology (Haidt, 2001). This change has led to the adop-
tion and exploration of what is now known as Intuitionism. Moral intuition is thus
far removed from the theoretical underpinnings of rationalist theory given that intu-
itionism is argued to be a process of cognition rather than a rationalization in search
of moral truths that then inform moral judgments. Intuitionists argue that rationalist
conception is instead a mischaracterization of actual occurrences in the brain; individ-
uals first intuit moral judgments, then only on an ex post facto basis does the agent
rationalize their decision (Haidt, 2001; Shweder & Haidt, 1993). Mostly, agents make
automatic value judgments, typically unaware of the cognitive processes that produced
such judgments. It is only after they are pressed for reasons that agents attempt to give
an argumentative rational for why they arrived at such a judgment, sometimes uncon-
vincingly (Haidt, 2001). Haidt (2001) constructs a narrative of safe, consensual incest.
This narrative invokes a visceral sense of ‘wrongness’ that agents who are presented
this story are hard pressed to give reasons for why they find it morally abhorrent.
Likewise, Klein (2016) proposes a variation of the trolley problem that also elicits a
‘wrongness’ feeling. Both examples are cited to illustrate how moral intuition works.
Individuals are presented cases; they are, in turn, asked to make a value judgment,
then once pressed for reasons for such judgement, they find difficulty in rationalizing
the inclination, thus emphasizing a lack of a priori reasoning (Klein, 2016).
Nonetheless, whether or not we take moral intuitionism as a real interpretation of
how human moral judgments are formed, issues still arise that provide practical prob-
lematic concerns. These problems are typically manifested in how we apply our moral
judgments as a product of intuition, primarily when intuition has been shown to be
highly susceptible to a number of cognitive biases (Brink, 2014; Cushman, Young, &
Hauser, 2006; Greene, 2014; Nichols & Knobe, 2007; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007;
Woodward & Allman, 2007). Such biases can affect the ways in which we value tech-
nologies, the way we approach technologies and the way in which we interact with
them. Missteps can cause a slowdown of progress at best and increase the risks of
catastrophic events at worst (Bostrom, 2014; Caviola et al., 2014).
In fact, Caviola et al. (2014) explain the potential effects of cognitive biases on
the value-perception of cognitive enhancing technologies (CE). They argue that the
polarized nature of the debates surrounding the ethical issues of CE can be explained
by the influence of biases on human reasoning, thus disposing the moral intuition of
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individuals to intuit in particular ways. They conclude that not only do cognitive
biases have the potential to lead people to make irrational value-judgments about CE
but that they are more likely to do so in a negative capacity. Likewise, these biases are
not exclusive to debates regarding CE but may be just as pervasive in discussions of
other transformative technologies.
Klein (2016) takes a different approach to our application of moral intuitions to
novel technologies. He argues that given our evolutionary history, and the rate of tech-
nological innovation, humans have failed to acquire moral intuitions in a capacity that
can sufficiently make value-judgments of technology. Because the increasing complexity
of these technologies makes the causal chains ambiguous, he argues that we naturally
tend to miss or ignore the ethical issues that emerge with these technologies. As a
consequence, Klein proposes that moral intuitions, because of their innate failures,
must be buttressed with "culture substitutes" that can help to make complex and
novel technologies easier to intuit. Because he argues that we are good at making
moral intuitions about our fellow human behaviour, one way to substitute intuition is
by employing what he calls a "what if it was human" method. This process involves
conceptualizing novel technology as if its uniqueness was embodied by a person. In
speculating how that person would behave, both publically and privately, can assist in
intuiting the moral value of the technology.
Regardless, the importance of moral intuition as an essential way of understanding
human judgment has become a dominating area of discussion in moral psychology. The
shift away from the traditional humanist view of humans as rational animals towards
one that argues that most of our moral judgments are a product of the unconscious
has significant implications for how we view emerging and converging technologies;
particularly given the susceptibility of moral intuitions to biases (Klein 2016).
Taking this into account, it is this paper’s contention is that the DFV approaches,
particularly VSD, although claiming to be predicated on a foundation of universal
moral values is in fact not, instead, upon closer inspection, most of the values in-
corporated are intuition based. Not only this, but I contend that objectivity in the
determination of values is not necessary. A functionalist, pragmatic approach is thus
adopted for the purposes of this paper. The intersubjectivity of moral intuitions, the
acknowledgment of this in DFV approaches and the strengthening of moral intuitions
through heuristic tools as mentioned in this paper provides at least one means by which
we can reflexively engage in RRI. The
As a consequence, any design framework or methodology that works as a function of
stakeholder values must take into account the inherent susceptibility of moral intuitions
to cognitive biases. The following section introduces the design methodology VSD. As
noted earlier, this paper aims to bolster the applicability of the VSD approach towards
the responsible innovation of transformative technologies. Because the discussion of
values in this paper is not restricted to VSD (meaning that the values and the related
issues are not VSD-exclusive), the implications drawn from this paper have a scope
that extends beyond VSD.
3. Value Sensitive Design (VSD)
Value Sensitive Design is an approach to the design of technology that is unique in
its methodology of accounting for human values during the design phases (Friedman
& Kahn Jr., 2002). Originating in the domain of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI),
VSD has since been developed as a proposed approach to the responsible innovation
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of many different technologies such as identity technologies (Briggs & Thomas, 2015),
energy technologies (Aad Correlje´, Eefje Cuppen, Marloes Dignum, 2015), information
and communication technology (ICT) (Dechesne et al., 2013; Friedman, 1997; Friedman
et al., 2013; Huldtgren, 2014; van den Hoven, 2007) and nanotechnology (Timmermans
et al., 2011; van den Hoven, 2014).
VSD is one of a host of ‘design-for-values’ or ‘safe-by-design’ approaches to RI (see
Micheletti & Benetti, 2016). The inception of these methodologies are in response to
some of the foundational issues debated within RI discourses, primarily those that
result from the the social construction and co-production of technological artifacts
(Foley, Bernstein, & Wiek, 2016; see also Pinch & Bijker, 1987). Firstly, the issues
associated with the infrastructural embeddedness of a technology over a period of time
make modification difficult. Hence, once the negative impacts of a technology emerge,
they may have already enrolled economic and political capital that make augmentations
challenging (Collingridge, 1980; Star, 1999). As such, we see how the governance of
technological artifacts are ex post facto, meaning they are retrospective in nature
and usually follow ubiquitous production of technologies (Kaiser, Kurath, Maasen, &
Rehmann-Sutter, 2009; Rip, 2009; Rip & Van Amerom, 2009). Likewise, there is a
seeming gap between the the enterprises of technological development and societal
requirements (Daniel, 2002; Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007).
DFV frameworks such as VSD were developed in the attempt to address these chal-
lenges. They are are attempts at balancing often divergent approaches to the amelio-
ration of these challenges, primary between risk-based and precautionary approaches
to design (Alvial-Palavicino, 2016; Brey, 2012; Brown, 2009; Guston, 2014; Nordmann,
2014; te Kulve & Rip, 2011). In doing so they generally aim to address these issues via
design by making foundational the dimensions of anticipation (future values, issues),
reflexivity (biases, assumptions, intentions), inclusion (of various stakeholders) and re-
sponsiveness (recursively operationalizing the former three practice) (Owen et al., 2013;
Owen, Macnaghten, & Stilgoe, 2012). Each, however, operationalize these dimensions
in their own way. This paper employs the VSD methodology because its formalization
of these dimensions is overtly explicit, making its evaluation of value-inclusions simpler
to demonstrate and its broader implications less convoluted.
VSD is defined as “a theoretically grounded approach to the design of technology
that accounts for human values in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout
the design process” (Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2002, 1). VSD is grounded on the foun-
dational premise that technologies embody values (they are value-laden) and provides
a framework and methodology for assessing the current design of technologies while
simultaneously integrating a proactive approach to guide the development of tech-
nologies both at the early stages of design and throughout the design process. What
differentiates VSD from other DFV approaches are seven distinct characteristics in
conjunction with one another:
(1) VSD aims to direct the development of technology not only through manipula-
tions in the process of design and development but in the early stages of design.
(2) VSD does not only incorporate the values of designers or those directly involved
as stakeholders, but also the public at large, industry and other sectors.
(3) VSD does not focus solely on the values gained through participatory or democ-
ratized means but rather seeks to account for all relevant values with particular
weight given to values with moral weight.
(4) VSD is a harmonized methodology that consists of three separate, but integrated
types of analyses: conceptual, empirical, and technical.
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(5) VSD does not view values as something that arise out of necessity from the
technology nor do values passively come from societal forces. Instead, VSD is
‘interactional,’ meaning that values are dynamic as technology affects individual
behaviour and society affects technological progress.
(6) VSD gives particular weight to the values of justice, human rights, and human
welfare. These values, taken from moral epistemology, are understood as being
evaluated independently of subjective or culture belief in them.
(7) Beyond moral epistemology, VSD methodology assumes that upon close analysis
of values, some values can be determined to be universal between differing cul-
tures and societies. Although these values may manifest themselves in varying
ways, upon close analysis one can decide that in fact those manifestations are
simply a variation of a universal value. Examples include freedom, trust, equality,
and privacy
All in all, VSD is a methodology that has been designed with the intention of be-
ing capable of integrating the values of stakeholders during the early design stages to
guide the technology in a more predictable way, while still allowing for the flexibil-
ity to account for emerging changes in values and impacts (Fig. 1). Those individuals
and groups that interact directly with the technology in question are considered direct
stakeholders while those in the peripheries are considered indirect. The VSD approach
requires that designers account for both direct and indirect stakeholder values in the
design phases, the latter of which is typically side-lined during conventional design
processes (Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2002; Taebi, Correljé, Cuppen, Dignum, & Pesch,
2014). This is not only done via consultation with existing literature on what stake-
holders value, bit through their direct enrollment. This means that diverse publics and
differing epistemic patches are particularly levied in order to more richly enhance the
legitimacy and salience of design (Cash et al., 2003; Chilvers, 2007; Delgado, Kjølberg,
& Wickson, 2010).
Additionally, one of the primary concerns of VSD is that issues arise with the appli-
cation of technology as a result of the ethical values that society holds related to that
application (Timmermans et al., 2011). In acknowledging this conflict, VSD aims to
account for the relevant societal values and address the potential conflict during design
stages (Capurro, Longstaff, Hanney, & Secko, 2015; Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2002; Taebi
et al., 2014). This means not only designing in what values are determined most per-
tinent, but also designing out any unwanted values. This involves an awareness that
designers can implicitly embed values given their relatively centralized positions in the
design process.
A step-by-step methodology for implementing the VSD framework has already ex-
plicated by Friedman, Kahn and Borinng (2008). As such I have chosen to forgo a
rephrasing of it given that the intention of this paper is not to advocate for the VSD
framework over other DFV methodologies, nor is it to provide a full account of the
feasibility or applicability of VSD to technology design. There has been much said in
the existing body of literature that has already aimed to discuss those topics. Instead,
this paper seeks to use the VSD methodology, particularly its emphasis on stakeholder
values to provide a more general discussion of stakeholder involvement in technological
design methodologies.
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Figure 1. The tripartite methodology of VSD is self-relfexive and recursively self-improving
4. The moral psychology of conceptual investigations
What are values? Where do values come from? Which values are socio-culturally unique
and which values universal? Which values can be integrated into the design of techno-
logical innovations? How do we balance apparently conflicting values such as auton-
omy and security? Should moral values always be given precedence over values that
are non-moral? These are some of the issues that are addressed by the VSD approach,
specifically by procedures outlined under conceptual investigations, one of the three
investigations that compose the tripartite methodology of VSD (Friedman & Kahn Jr.,
2002).
Conceptual investigations usually involve designers determining how both direct and
indirect stakeholders might be affected by the technological innovation that they aim to
design. Initial conceptual investigations may take the form of drawing upon the relevant
literature of technologies that are applicably similar or involved in the technology that
designers seek to develop. In the case of developing a nanopharmaceutical drug like a
Doctor in a Cell, values such as privacy (medical data collected by the device), informed
consent, safety and efficacy can be conceptualized as posing ethical and societal issues
(Casci, 2004; Lucivero, 2012; Timmermans et al., 2011). The literature that analyses
these particular issues, whether it is the issues per se or in the context of some other
technological innovation, can then be levied in order to understand better what the
impacts of those issues may be in relation to nanopharmacy. The next step would
be to use the initial results of the conceptual analysis to begin the technical work in
designing the system. However, in order to successfully and holistically manage this,
the epistemic status of the investigated values needs to be clearly demarcated as well
as means by which that status can be buttressed by drawing upon heuristic tools.
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4.1. The epistemology of conceptual analyses
The epistemic status of the values gathered by designers during conceptual investi-
gations seems, as a result of the theories proposed by moral psychology, dubious. If
we assume that value judgments are in fact the result of a cognitive process and that
reasoning is an ex post facto activity, then the susceptibility of cognition to various
cognitive biases makes the resulting value judgments less credible. Yet, the value judg-
ments are a critical part of the VSD methodology. How can we reconcile the apparent
lack of value-grounding in the VSD approach?
Van Wynsberghe’s (2013) approach to this realization was to conceptualize the ori-
gin of value in the VSD framework. She attempted to add a level of normativity to
the ethical valuations that are essential to the conceptual investigations of VSD. Her
application of VSD to the design of care robots was thus argued to be grounded on the
existent values of care. Two separate arguments can be made regarding this manoeu-
vre: 1) the VSD methodology is meant to be augmented in ways that best integrate
it with current practices and activities, thus her augmentation was simply a spirited
instantiation of VSD philosophy, and 2) VSD methodology is grounded in normative
ethics by taking as its foundation “moral value such as freedom, equality, trust, auton-
omy or privacy justice [that] is facilitated or constrained by technology” (Friedman,
1997; van den Hoven, 2013, 137). Hence, Van Wynsberghe’s adoption of values specific
to care could be viewed simply as field-specific interpretations of the already grounding
values that VSD holds as foundational, thus making her move nothing more than a
context-sensitive focusing of existing values.
The spirit of this approach, however, opens up what could ultimately prove to be a
detrimental stance against adopting a VSD methodology. Rather than designers hav-
ing to manipulate the VSD approach for every particular technological innovation that
they are attempting to develop responsibly, I propose that the solution to the suscep-
tibility of moral judgments on account of cognitive biases does not lie in the search
for a normative moral foundation but rather can be solved by adding a new method-
ological tool to the stage of conceptual analyses. Cognitive biases influence our moral
intuitions, particularly in relation to controversial technologies (Caviola et al., 2014).
Thus, to more authentically ascertain the moral intuitions of individuals, and in turn
gain a better grasp of the intersubjective values that they hold regarding a particular
technology, it is a useful practice for designers, during their conceptual investigations,
to employ certain psychological heuristic practices that reduce the influence of cog-
nitive biases toward technology (see Bostrom & Ord, 2006; Larrick, 2004; Savulescu,
2007).
Hence, the goal of grounding VSD in objective/universal values is not only dubious,
given what I have discussed regarding intuitionism, but unnecessary. The current need
for a DFV, like VSD, for transformative technology creates a time-sensitive imperative
to instantiate a design methodology before the technologies are developed, many of
which are currently in development. As such, a pragmatic impetus exists to regard-
ing the existent DFV approaches, those being: the realization of the intersubjectivity
of moral intuitions, the lack of a need for value objectivity and the need to de-bias
stakeholder value intuitions. Heuristic tools can help designers with the latter.
4.2. A heuristic toolkit
Given that conceptual investigations in VSD require an analysis of the ethical literature
available to better understand the moral and non-moral values of stakeholders at play,
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a good starting point for the designers who seek to apply a VSD methodology would be
to acknowledge the theoretical underpinnings of the moral epistemology of the values
investigated. This means that developers understand how moral judgments are made
and that cognitive biases affect moral judgments. In light of this, conceptual analysis
should not only account for the ethical literature at play, but also the psychological
literature and relevant scientific evidence that can be levied to better justify which
values are included in the design as well as how tradeoff values are balanced (Caviola
et al., 2014). Likewise, remedial measures must also be put into play in order to better
judge which values are most authentic and also to create impartial evaluations through
employing simple heuristic tests.
One such heuristic test is Bostrom and Ord’s (2006) Double Reversal Test that aims
at reducing the status quo bias in its judgments regarding technological innovation.
They describe the effectiveness of the Double Reversal Test in its applicability to
cognitive enhancement technologies saying that:
The Double Reversal Test works by combining two possible perceptions of the status
quo. On the one hand, the status quo can be thought of as defined by the current (av-
erage) value of the parameter in question. To preserve this status quo, we intervene to
offset the decrease in cognitive ability that would result from exposure to the hazardous
chemical. On the other hand, the status quo can also be thought of as the default state
of affairs that results if we do not intervene. To preserve this status quo, we abstain
from reversing the original cognitive enhancement when the damaging effects of the
poisoning are about to wear off. By contrasting these two perceptions of the status
quo, we can pin down the influence that status quo bias exerts on our intuitions about
the expected benefit of modifying the parameter in our actual situation. (Bostrom &
Ord, 2006, p. 673)
Hence, its purpose, as Bostrom and Ord clearly state, is to attempt to determine
exactly how the status quo bias influences intuition. In doing so, we can better under-
stand exactly how and why individuals argue for specific values. Designers whose aim
it is to apply the VSD methodology as thoroughly as possible need to approach their
conceptual investigations with the additional activity of de-biasing their moral valu-
ations. Because transformative technologies are more likely to elicit moral intuitions
that have a higher likelihood of being influenced by biases, as a consequence of the
controversial nature of the technologies (Caviola et al., 2014).
As such, what is required of designers is a holistic account of how to responsibly
innovate through a DFV methodology. The VSD framework provides a sound basis
from which to start, however fundamental characteristics of the method that may, from
the outset, be susceptible to criticism need to be addressed before we can confidently
adopt the approach ubiquitously. Work is already being done on the status of moral
intuitions in making judgments about technology (e.g., Klein, 2016), as has been the
role that cognitive biases play when making intuitive judgments about transformative
technologies (e.g., Caviola et al., 2014; Oliveira, 2009; Partridge, Lucke, Finnoff, & Hall,
2011). The VSD approach needs to begin by taking this literature into account and
integrating it into the basic methodology rather than relying on designers to change the
method in an ad hoc fashion for every potential application (although a basic element
of change will always be necessary given the diverse range of applications). Addressing
the issue of the contentiousness of moral intuitions not only strengthens the VSD
and other stakeholder-centered approaches by reinforcing their moral grounding, but
also to better understand the authentic values of stakeholders beyond the veil of bias
interference.
There are a host of potential de-biasing methods that can be employed by designers,
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each of which may be more applicable to a particular application than others. Because
DFV approaches are principled and formulaic in their procedures, it is beyond this
paper’s scope in determining which tools are best suited to which application. As such,
future research projects, such as the ones described in the proceeding section, should
explore which methods are best employed in particular developmental streams.
5. Implications and Further Research
The main purpose of this paper was to show how DFV approaches, particularly those
that centralize the position of stakeholders in the design of new technologies face an
epistemological gape in determining the values that stakeholders express; that is, that
the moral values that are of critical import to VSD (and values in general for DFV
approaches) are subject to cognitive biases. Because one of the primary means by
which stakeholder values are extracted is by simply asking stakeholders what they
value, the lack of a priori moral reasoning that moral psychology shows possess an
issue for arriving at a more authentically informed RI.
These novel technologies, such as nanotechnology, biotechnology and artificial intel-
ligence have been predicted to, at the very least, have major economic and societal
impacts, unchecked development that lack explicit value engagement may prove catas-
trophic. As this paper opened, technology is inherently value-laden, and VSD takes
this as its founding precept. Designing without values is impossible: whether or not
they are deliberate is a matter of particular importance. As such, there is an urgency to
direct the development of these transformative innovations towards beneficial futures
viz. the embedding of pertinent stakeholder values and designing out those that run
contrary to those beneficial futures.
This aim of this paper has been a humble one. Rather than offer a transformative
or novel design methodology that seeks to encompass all of the values and issues that
exist or may emerge, it has opted to offer a critique of current DFV methodology as
they pertain particularly to the enrollment of stakeholder values as well as one of a
potential number of ways to strengthen said methodologies. The use of heuristics in
order to achieve a greater degree of authenticity regarding stakeholder values is but a
simple, ad hoc, functional step that can be taken now. Further research projects should
look at the viability of moral imagination theories that may be useful in bolstering the
value-based investigations that DFV methodologies employ (see Boenink, Swierstra,
& Stemerding, 2010; Lucivero et al., 2011; Mahoney & Litz, 2000). Doing so may be
fruitful both prior and during the employment of DFV approaches. Because VSD aims
to be self-reflexive and recursively improving, like many transformative technologies
that can be directed through its use, its continually improvement, and even foundations
restructuring through new research projects feeds into its modus operandi.
Additionally, further research into DFV approaches should look into their potential
to anticipate not only emerging future values, but to also anticipate potential gover-
nance needs. As such the enrollment of stakeholders and the resultant value-integration
may lead to novel and emerging governance structures and institutions. The potential
for DFV approaches to anticipate potentially necessary governance mechanisms may
be particularly salient as designers and other enrolled actors have a privileged position
to inform policy makers of possible governance needs.
Finally, the application of de-biasing heuristics does meet particular constraints and
contentions. The primary being their ability to be self-applied, that is, for designers
and direct stakeholders who participate directly within the development and design of
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technologies to self-apply these tools. Arguments could be made against this paper’s
thesis that there is a lack of symmetry in the operationalization of heuristics. This
contention is methodological in nature, and requires a reformulation of the principles
of DFV approaches in order to account for a symmetrical distribution and application
of heuristic tools. As such, future research projects could explore how designers and
developers can self-apply de-biasing tools in order to ensure that implicit and unwanted
values are not designed into technologies. As such, the designing out of unwanted values
plays a critical part of this as already mentioned, and because this is a principle of
many DFV approaches – most explicitly VSD – tools to ensure its success are of
methodological importance.
6. Conclusion
Although further research on these issues may show that we do need new normative
frameworks for emerging technologies, as things currently stand it is unclear what
those moral frameworks could or should be. Instead, we should focus on the very real
and pressing issues that exist given that transformative technologies are already heavily
funded, their development underway, and their convergence already being experienced.
In light of the pragmatic imperative that now exists, it is up to us to determine how
we can intervene in the development of these transformative, emerging and converging
technologies to direct them in such a way that is aligned with the values of stakeholders.
The VSD approach is one such methodology that aims to incorporate the values of
stakeholders during the early design phases. However, the current VSD methodology,
although accepting of augmentation, requires far too much ad hoc manipulation for
integration into existing design and development practices.
What is needed is a reimagining of DFV frameworks. This reimaging, regarding
VSD in this case, preserves the tripartite investigations of the approach while adding
a critical tool to conceptual investigations. By adding heuristic tools to the conceptual
analyses of values, the VSD methodology is strengthened against doubts about the
epistemic status of moral judgments produced by moral intuitions. Although this paper
has not shown that the employment of heuristics creates epistemic certainty regarding
moral judgments, it has demonstrated that in light of the pragmatic urgency, as well
as the current status of the origin of moral judgments, the implementation of practices
that aim to de-bias moral judgments is critical to the success of responsible innovation
viz. DFV approaches.
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